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Abstract: During the nineteenth century, changing conceptions of mental disorder had 
profound implications for the way that criminal responsibility was conceived. As medical 
writers and practitioners increasingly drew attention to the complexities of insanity, the 
grounds on which mentally abnormal offenders could be excused began to seem unduly 
restrictive. By way of a contribution to our understanding of this development, this article 
examines how the growing disparity unfolded in Scotland. I argue that the requirements of 
the insanity defence, as set out within judicial directions, reflect core facets of Scottish 
Common Sense philosophical thought, including Thomas Reid’s view of human agency and 
understanding of ‘common sense’. Building on this contention, I suggest that Scottish 
Common Sense philosophy played an important role in the development of Scottish mental 
state defences more broadly, and can provide an original interpretation of the way the 
doctrines of provocation and diminished responsibility changed during this era.  
 
 
Keywords: Common Sense philosophy, Thomas Reid, Dugald Stewart, John Abercrombie, 
criminal law, Scots law, criminal responsibility, insanity, mental disorder, legal history, 
provocation, diminished responsibility. 
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‘UNGOVERNABLE FEELINGS AND PASSIONS’: COMMON SENSE PHILOSOPHY 
AND MENTAL STATE DEFENCES IN NINETEENTH CENTURY SCOTLAND 
Chloë Kennedy 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
During the nineteenth century, the extent to which mentally abnormal offenders ought to be 
held accountable for their crimes was a pressing concern in both medical and legal circles. As 
medical writers and practitioners advanced new understandings of mental disorder, the 
narrow view of insanity employed within the criminal law began to appear unduly restrictive.  
In this article I explore how the contested boundary between sanity and insanity, and criminal 
responsibility and non-responsibility, was delineated in the Scottish context, where it has 
received relatively little attention.1 I assess how the Scottish judiciary handled emerging 
notions of insanity,2 which posed a risk to the way criminal responsibility was understood, 
and situate these responses in the wider medico-legal debates that occurred within Britain and 
America throughout much of the century.  
 Whilst these medico-legal debates are crucial to understanding the law’s 
development, they provide only part of the explanation. As Wiener and others have 
recognised,3  disagreements over the proper parameters of criminal responsibility touched 
                                                        
 Lecturer in Criminal Law, University of Edinburgh. 
1 From a large body of historical scholarship on insanity and criminal responsibility, the main 
contribution relating to Scotland is R A Houston, Madness and Society in Eighteenth-Century 
Scotland (1999). 
2 In making this assessment, I concentrate on the most significant reported cases in which 
insanity was pled as a defence. Although the Books of Adjournal contain a number of 
unreported cases in which insanity was pled, these cases disclose little, if anything, about the 
arguments made by counsel or the directions given to the jury. 
3 M J Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal: Culture, Law and Policy in England, 1830-1914 
(1990); R Smith, Trial by Medicine: Insanity and Responsibility in Victorian Trials (1981). 
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upon fundamental philosophical and theological issues, including beliefs about free will, 
necessity and the capacities of ‘ordinary’ individuals. These deliberations were particularly 
salient in the nineteenth century because, apart from being central to questions about criminal 
responsibility, they featured in broadly contemporaneous philosophical discourse over the 
relationship between reason and the passions and the limits of self-governance.4 As I discuss 
further below, these topics were pertinent to disputes over the existence, and legal 
significance, of volitional insanity5 that arose at the start of the nineteenth century. Prevailing 
philosophical views therefore constitute an important angle from which to consider how the 
contours of criminal responsibility were drawn during this period. In light of this, I offer a 
reading of the insanity defence, and the mental state defences of provocation and diminished 
responsibility,6 which links their development to key tenets of Common Sense philosophy – a 
school of thought which enjoyed considerable prominence in nineteenth century Scotland. 7 
 From its inception during the eighteenth century until its decline in the closing 
decades of the nineteenth century, Common Sense philosophy was an orthodox component of 
a Scottish university education, 8 the idiosyncratic mainstay of which was a solid grounding 
in metaphysical and moral philosophy.9 Outside the universities philosophical knowledge 
was prevalent too, as many of the readers and consumers of philosophical texts were middle 
                                                        
4 See J A Harris (ed) The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century 
(2013). 
5 Mental disorder afflicting the sufferer’s will and self-control. 
6 Provocation is included on the basis that loss of self-control can be considered akin to a 
mental state (S Yannoulidis, “Excusing Fleeting Mental States: Provocation, Involuntariness 
and Normative Practice” (2005) 12 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 23).  
7 Scottish Common Sense philosophy also played an important role in medico-legal debates 
about responsibility in antebellum America (S L Blumenthal, “The Mind of a Moral Agent: 
Scottish Common Sense Philosophy and the Problem of Responsibility in Nineteenth-
Century American Law” (2008) 26(1) LHR 99). 
8 G Graham, “Hamilton, Scottish Common Sense, and the Philosophy of the Conditioned” in 
W J Mander (ed), The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century 
(2014) 135 at 135-137, 148. 
9 G E Davie, The Democratic Intellect (1961) 7. 
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class men in pursuit of a civilized mind and cultivated taste. 10  A proportion of this 
demographic would have been lawyers and judges, for although a university education was 
not a formal requirement for admission to the Faculty of Advocates, candidates with a broad, 
liberal education were increasingly desirable from the middle of the eighteenth century.11 
Indeed, candidates without a university degree were examined on, inter alia, metaphysical 
philosophy, including The Collected Works Of Thomas Reid, as edited by Sir William 
Hamilton.12 
Within the topography of British philosophy, the Scottish Common Sense school was 
one of the two metaphysical systems that dominated the first half of the nineteenth century, 
the other being the English Empirical school. 13  In contrast to the Empirical school, a 
fundamental principle of the Scottish school was the existence of experience-independent 
speculative and practical laws.14 This principle had important repercussions for the school’s 
theories of perception and knowledge, both of which attached considerable significance to 
common sense.15 The school is primarily remembered for these theories,16 but its members 
also made important contributions to debates about morality and determinism. Thomas Reid, 
in particular, was noteworthy amongst the libertarians of his age, arguing that human beings, 
as moral agents, had the ‘active power’ to govern themselves and overcome their desires and 
passions. 17  Connected to this, and along with other Common Sense philosophers, Reid 
subscribed to (and developed) ethical intuitionism – the idea that humans can immediately 
                                                        
10 J A Harris, “Introduction”, in Harris (ed), Oxford Handbook (n 4) 1 at 8. 
11 J W Cairns, “The Formation of the Scottish Legal Mind in the Eighteenth Century: Themes 
of Humanism and Enlightenment in the Admission of Advocates” in N MacCormick & P 
Birks (eds) The Legal Mind: Essays for Tony Honoré (1986) 253. 
12 “The Education of Scottish Lawyers” (1869) 3 Journal of Jurisprudence 124 at 130. 
13 W J Mander, “Introduction”, in Mander (ed), Oxford Handbook (n 8) 1 at 5. 
14 S A Grave, The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense (1960) 3. 
15 Ibid 19-20, ch 4. 
16 Partly because they received much attention from the school’s opponents (Graham (n8) at 
150).  
17 S Greenberg, “Liberty and Necessity”, in Harris (ed), Oxford Handbook (n 4) 248 at 263. 
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apprehend moral truths – which was the main rival to the moral utilitarianism that gained 
traction in nineteenth century England.18  
Each of these elements of Common Sense philosophy is reflected in my reading of the 
development of mental state defences in nineteenth century Scotland, to which there is two 
strands. The first strand examines the rejection of new understandings of mental disorder 
which, from the first third of the century, threatened to narrow the scope of criminal 
responsibility. This effort was led by Lord Hope from the middle of the century and, I 
suggest, reflects a view of human agency consistent with that of the Scottish Common Sense 
philosophers John Abercrombie, Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart. According to this view, 
individuals were vested with an innate power to perceive moral truths and to act in 
accordance with them – a power that was intimately bound up with the ability to resist 
undesirable passions and desires. As I seek to show, a similar perspective on human agency 
also appears to have informed the way the provocation defence was defined in Scotland at the 
end of the eighteenth century.  
The second strand focuses on how, during the final third of the century, the insanity 
defence became based on the loose test of ‘soundness of mind’. This change meant the jury 
was effectively entrusted with determining the substance of the test for assessing the sanity of 
an accused person, rather than simply the task of applying it. Paying heed to the significance 
of prevailing philosophical beliefs, I suggest this shift also reflects core features of the 
Common Sense school of thought. Coupled to the development of diminished responsibility, 
which allowed the jury to mitigate culpability on the basis of mental unsoundness falling 
short of insanity, this evolution in the law reflects the confidence in common sense 
knowledge that was central to Common Sense philosophy.  
 
                                                        
18 Mander (n13) at 11. Leading utilitarians, including Jeremy Bentham and John Stewart 
Mill, were highly critical of Scottish Common Sense philosophy. 
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B. EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY DEVELOPMENTS 
 
The starting point for understanding the two interpretive strands of this article is to set 
out some of the early nineteenth century developments within medical and legal 
understandings of mental disorder and in medico-legal relations. Changes during this time, 
including the increased involvement of medical men (and others charged with managing the 
mentally disordered) in the identification and treatment of insanity,19 set the tone for the 
consternation that arose between legal and medical professionals later in the century. In 
addition to appearing more frequently as witnesses in trials, 20  medical writers began to 
advance nuanced conceptions of insanity, which incorporated what some lawyers referred to 
as ‘partial insanity’. 21  This concept of partial insanity could refer to insanity that was 
intermittent, mild, or circumscribed in one of two senses, i.e. relating only to one subject or 
affecting only one part of the mind.22  
The latter two forms of partial insanity were especially significant in the early 
nineteenth century, when medical consensus grew around the existence of delusions – 
                                                        
19 A Loughnan & T Ward, “Emergent Authority and Expert Knowledge: Psychiatry and 
Criminal Responsibility in the UK” 37 (2014) Int’lJL&Psychiatry 25 at 27. 
20 J P Eigen & G Andoll, “From Mad-Doctor to Forensic Witness: The Evolution of Early 
English Court Psychiatry” (1986) 9 Int’lJL&Psychiatry 159; T Ward, “Observers, Advisors, 
or Authorities? Experts, Juries and Criminal Responsibility in Historical Perspective” (2001) 
12 (1) Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 105; R A Houston, “Courts, doctors, and insanity 
defences in 18th and early 19th century Scotland” (2003) 26 Int’lJL&Psychiatry 339. 
21 Reflecting on the sources of medico-legal discord at the end of the nineteenth century, 
Reginald Noott, senior assistant medical officer at Broadmoor Asylum, remarked that ‘the 
legal opinion was that only certain forms and degrees of insanity should constitute 
irresponsibility; the medical profession generally not recognising the term “partial insanity”, 
as understood by lawyers, maintained…that all forms and degrees of insanity should 
constitute irresponsibility’ (R H Noott, “The Responsibility of the Insane: Should they be 
punished? A Reply to Dr Mercier” (1899) 45 (188) Journal of Mental Science 53 at 54). 
22  G Berrios, “Descriptive Psychiatry and Psychiatric Nosology during the Nineteenth 
Century”, in E R Wallace & J Gach (eds), History of Psychiatry and Medical Psychology 
(2008) 353 at 365. 
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madness that seemed confined to one principal idea23 – and members of the French school of 
médicin mentale, led by the psychiatrists Philippe Pinel, Jean-Étienne Dominique Esquirol 
and Étienne-Jean Georget, put forward the notion of manie sans délire – insanity without any 
reasoning defect, hallucination or delusion.24 This form of insanity was innovative, for it 
raised the possibility of purely emotional or volitional insanity.25  
The idea of purely emotional or volitional insanity was propounded by British writers 
too, including James Prichard, a Scottish-born physician, who argued that there could be “a 
morbid perversion of the feelings, affections and active powers, without any illusion or 
erroneous conviction impressed upon the understanding”. 26  To describe this affliction 
Prichard coined the phrase ‘moral insanity’, by which he meant “a disorder which affects the 
feelings and affections, or what are termed the moral powers of the mind, in contradistinction 
to the powers of understanding and the intellect”.27 While some specialists confirmed the 
existence of this type of insanity, 28 others were more dubious, questioning many cases in 
which the morals were said to be depraved but the intellect untouched.29 
These new understandings of insanity differed from the complete lack of reason and 
understanding that traditionally characterised non-responsibility under English law 30  and, 
                                                        
23 J P Eigen, “Delusion in the Courtroom: The Role of Partial Insanity in Early Forensic 
Testimony” (1991) 35 Medical History 25 at 32-33.   
24 Ibid, at 34. 
25 Berrios (n 22) at 366. 
26 J C Pritchard, A Treatise on Insanity and other Disorder Affecting the Mind (1835) 12. 
27 J C Pritchard, On the Different forms of Insanity, In relation to Jurisprudence, Designed 
for the use of Persons Concerned in Legal Questions Regarding Unsoundness of Mind (1842) 
19.  
28 H Maudsley, “Remarks on Crime and Criminals” (1888) 34 Journal of Mental Science 146 
at 163. In a paper read to the annual meeting of the Association of Medical Officers of 
Asylums and Hospitals for the Insane, Dr Davey stated that insanity is a disease “not so much 
of the knowing or intellectual faculties of the mind, as of the active moral feelings i.e. the 
affections or emotions” ((1858) 5 (27) Journal of Mental Science 82 at 87). 
29 H Monro, “On the Nomenclature of the Various forms of Insanity” (1856) 2 (17) Asylum 
Journal 286 at 292.  
30 Eigen (n 23) at 27.  
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despite favourable reception by jurors, never amounted to established ‘tests’ of insanity.31 
Similarly, they did not sit entirely comfortably with the test of non-responsibility prescribed 
by Scots law at the time they emerged. According to Hume, the defence required that the 
accused had suffered an “absolute alienation of reason”, depriving him of the “knowledge of 
the true position of things about him”.32 Though based on an intellectual understanding of 
mental disorder, thereby precluding purely volitional or emotional insanity, the defence was 
potentially available to those incapable of judging “upon any particular situation or 
conjecture, of what is right or wrong with regard to it” but who nevertheless retained a 
“vestige of reason”.33 The restrictions on this type of plea were demonstrated in Eugene 
Whelps, in which Lord Justice Clerk Hope stated that although it was possible that 
monomania34 or mental delusions on a particular subject might proceed to such a degree as to 
amount to general insanity, unless it were proved that the delusion caused the criminal act 
and that the accused was unable to distinguish right from wrong there should be no acquittal. 
35  
The earlier case of Malcolm McLeod36 further indicates how far partial insanity was 
accepted in Scots law. Counsel for the accused relied on Prichard’s A Treatise on Insanity 
and other Disorders Affecting the Mind to argue that insanity could include monomania 
(whereby the understanding is partially diseased under the influence of an illusion relating to 
one subject, but the intellectual powers on other subjects are in great measure unimpaired) 
and moral insanity (where there is no illusion or defect of the intellect but a morbid 
perversion of the feelings, temper and natural impulses). In directing the jury, Lord Cockburn 
                                                        
31 Ibid at 39, 48. 
32 D Hume, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland Respecting Crimes vol. I, (1797) 23.  
33 Ibid 24. 
34 ‘Monomania’ was used to refer both to partial insanity of the intellect and independently 
arising disorders of the emotions and of the will (Eigen (n 23) at 35). 
35 (1842) Brown 378 at 381. 
36 (1838) Swin 2 88. 
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drew their attention to the relevant legal authorities37 and concluded that, on the evidence,38 
not only had the insanity defence not been made out, it had been disproved. In the absence of 
fuller directions it is unclear whether this conclusion was based on his Lordship’s rejection of 
these forms of partial insanity or the failure of defence counsel to prove them on the evidence 
presented. I would suggest the former is more likely, at least in relation to moral insanity, 
since by the authorities cited the defence required an absolute alienation of reason in relation 
to the relevant act and the accused’s lack of knowledge that he was doing wrong in 
committing it.  
By the middle of the nineteenth century, then, the suggestions by some medical 
professionals that insanity might be confined to one topic or afflict only the emotions or 
volition had entered the courtroom in both England and Scotland. However, with the 
exception of salient delusions, which formed part of the Scottish defence, in neither 
jurisdiction did these new forms of insanity amount to established legal tests. At this time the 
now famous trial of Daniel McNaughten for the murder of Edward Drummond was held, 
during which defence counsel, Alexander Cockburn QC, relied on expert medical testimony 
and psychological publications39 to argue that McNaughten, who suffered paranoid delusions, 
was “the victim of ungovernable impulse, which wholly takes away from him the character of 
a reasonable and responsible being”. 40  By intertwining these volitional and cognitive 
                                                        
37 Hume’s Commentaries and Alison’s Principles of the Criminal Law of Scotland (1832).  
38 Including medical evidence that moral insanity could exist with no particular delusion and 
that partial derangement might impel a person, conscious that he is doing wrong, to commit a 
crime (at 97). 
39 Including Prichard’s On the Different forms of Insanity and Isaac Ray’s A Treatise on the 
Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity (1838). 
40 B L Diamond, “Isaac Ray and the Trial of Daniel McNaghten” (1956) 112 (8) American 
Journal of Psychiatry 651. 
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impairments, Cockburn managed to present a case of volitional insanity as one that satisfied 
the legal test of non-responsibility.41  
Following McNaughten’s acquittal, Her Majesty’s judges were summoned before the 
House of Lords to clarify the law of insanity. Their statement on the matter (which is now 
referred to as the McNaughten Rules) asserted the cognitive foundations of the defence and 
effectively insulated the law from the notion of volitional insanity. The Rules stated: 
 
That if the accused was conscious that the act was one which he ought not to do; and 
if the act was at the same time contrary to law, he is punishable…to establish a 
defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that at the time of 
committing the act the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, 
from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was 
doing, or as not to know what he was doing was wrong.42  
 
This test of insanity was much criticised, especially by medical commentators, for it relied on 
an outmoded understanding of mental disorder and ensured that criminal responsibility 
remained within the competence of legal expertise, thereby rendering medical opinion 
unnecessary. 43  Though the stringency of the Rules was eventually diluted through a 
                                                        
41 K Smith, “General Principles of Criminal Law” in W Cornish et al (eds) The Oxford 
History of the Laws of England  (vol XIII) (2010) 217 at 239. 
42 R v McNaughten (1843) 8 ER 718 at 719. 
43 There were legal critics of the Rules but medical criticism (which was not unanimous) led 
to hostility between the two professions. See Smith (n 37) 243-256; “Lord Bramwell on 
Crime and Insanity” (1886) 32 (137) Journal of Mental Science 65; S W North, “Insanity and 
Crime: Paper read before the York Law Students’ Society” (1886) 32 (138) Journal of 
Mental Science 163.  
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combination of judicial gloss and executive leniency, they remained the formal expression of 
English law.44  
 
C. LORD HOPE’S REJECTION OF VOLITIONAL INSANITY  
 
The tension between medical and legal views on mental disorder and criminal responsibility, 
which had been growing throughout the early nineteenth century, escalated further in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. By this time, it had become more common for medical 
witnesses to provide courtroom testimony and to lay claim to a body of expert knowledge 
that uniquely qualified them to diagnose insanity.45 Additionally, the gulf between medical 
and legal conceptions of insanity became ever more apparent, as medical professionals 
gained a conspicuous voice with which to express their discontent over the substance and 
application of legal tests of non-responsibility.46 In respect of the law’s application, a core 
complaint was that jurors and judges afforded insufficient weight to medical opinion – a 
phenomenon that some scholars have interpreted as evidence of a battle for recognition 
waged by the then-nascent psychiatric profession in the face of sceptical lawyers, judges, 
journalists and other medical professionals.47  
 Together, these developments appear to have contributed to increased anxiety over 
maintaining the boundaries of criminal responsibility. In an era marked by heightened 
concern with upholding political and social order, any attempt to widen the grounds on which 
                                                        
44 Smith (n 41) at 243-256; N Walker, Crime and Insanity in England (vol 1) (1968) ch 13. 
Judicial departure from the Rules also occurred in America (“Legal Tests of Criminal 
Responsibility” (1889) 35 (149) Journal of Mental Science 136; “The Recent Judicial 
Departure in Insanity Cases” (1889) 33 JJur 26). 
45 Ward (n 20) at 108; Loughnan & Ward (n 19) at 28. 
46 Numerous articles illustrating this discontent exist in the Journal of Mental Science from 
the journal’s inception in middle of the nineteenth century through to the end of the century. 
47 Smith, Trial by Medicine 168 and see Loughnan, Manifest Madness 145 for discussion of 
this interpretation. 
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criminal conduct might be excused was regarded unfavourably.48 Part of the hostility towards 
medical opinion, where it existed, was therefore due to the perceived tendency of physicians 
to diagnose offenders as insane, and thus non-responsible, too readily. In 1867 Dr David 
Skae, a specialist in insanity, wrote that medical men had been accused of “making out 
everybody to be mad, and every foolish, vicious, or criminal act to be a proof of madness”.49 
According to Dr Henry Maudsley, a prominent British psychiatrist of the time, these concerns 
were “not without excuse”, since doctors who testified in court were known to offer support 
to any case, no matter how weak, and often without regard to differing medical opinion.50  
This consternation forms part of the background against which the Scottish judiciary, 
starting with Lord Hope, rejected the suggestion that volitional disorders should excuse the 
accused. Though the insanity defence did not appear to incorporate such disorders, during the 
second half of the century references to irresistible impulses and moral insanity began to 
appear more frequently in the High Court of Justiciary. It appears likely that the McNaughten 
trial could have contributed to this development.51 The case was well-publicised52 and it 
seems no coincidence that just one year after its conclusion defence counsel in the trial of Jas 
                                                        
48 Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal 11, 84. 
49 D Skae, The Legal Relations of Insanity: The Civil Incapacity and Legal Responsibility of 
the Insane (1867) 5.  
50 H Maudsley, “Criminal Responsibility in Relation to Insanity” (1895) 41 (175) Journal of 
Mental Science 657, at 661. Dr Hood, a physician in the Royal Bethlem Hospital, noted that 
several patients who were acquitted after pleading insanity displayed no symptoms of mental 
disorder, and speculated that the cause was ‘“specialist” physicians [who] would lend 
themselves to the lawyers to whom the defence is entrusted’ (W C Hood, “Criminal Lunatics. 
A Letter to the Chairman of the Commission for Lunacy” (1860) 6 (34) Journal of Mental 
Science 513 at 515). 
51 Cf Walker, who describes the Rules as having been “merely interesting news” in Scotland 
(Walker, Crime and Insanity 144).  
52 For example, in Scotland the Caledonian Mercury published a lengthy account of the trial 
proceedings (‘Trial of M’Naughten for the Murder of Mr Drummond’ March 6 and March 9 
1843) and The Scotsman featured a length article about McNaughten’s acquittal 
(‘M’Naughten’s Acquittal’ March 22 1843). 
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Gibson53 cited Ray’s work to support his argument that the accused suffered delusions and 
was therefore not a voluntary agent.  
 Lord Hope’s remarks in the later case of George Lillie Smith hint at this possibility. In 
his charge to the jury, he commented that: 
 
I do not intend to state the law at such length as was done by me in 1844, in the case 
of Gibson…we had then to contend with very mischievous notions set abroad by 
several writers and medical men on this very subject, and aggravated, I am sorry to 
say, by inconsiderately humane verdicts in another part of the country.54 
 
 In response to counsel’s arguments, Lord Hope informed the jury that they were not 
to consider the definition of insanity offered by medical men, especially not the “fantastic and 
shadowy” definition found in Ray.55 Quoting from the McNaughten Rules, his Lordship 
explained that they expressed the law of Scotland, a fact he considered fortunate because 
“anything more varying, or inconsistent, or unsatisfactory, than the definitions of insanity 
given by Ray and many other medical writers cannot be conceived”.56 From this excerpt it is 
                                                        
53 (1844) 2 Brown 332. 
54 (1855) 2 Irv 1. Seven months after the McNaughten trial, Lord Cockburn remarked: “I 
have little doubt that, at present, when the benevolent towards criminals have succeeded in 
raising a cry against punishing any culprit who had, or says that he had, a crotchet which led 
him to commit his offence (which they call by some technical name), there are very few acts 
of criminal malice that are not helped on by the idea that this defence [insanity] may be 
successful in the time of need” (H Cockburn, Circuit Journeys (1889) 203-204 (entry dated 1 
October 1843). 
55 Gibson at 357. Lord Hope seems to mimic the words of Alexander Cockburn, who told the 
McNaughten jury they were unable to judge the ‘nice and shadowy distinctions’ between 
soundness and unsoundness of mind as well as experts (quotation referred to in Ward (n 20) 
at 111). 
56 Gibson at 358.  
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clear that doubts as to the reliability of medical opinion drove Lord Hope’s efforts to prevent 
these new forms of insanity infiltrating the law.57  
Nevertheless, this scepticism only partly explains Lord Hope’s attitude. In addition to 
disdain for medical opinion, Lord Hope’s dismissal of these types of insanity reflects the 
general concern within Victorian Britain to inculcate self-control and foster an ethos of 
respectability.58 However, rather than promoting the utilitarian ideal that underpinned some 
English efforts to instill self-regulation – the “Benthamite calculator…whose attention was 
habitually focused upon distant consequences”59 – Lord Hope’s dismissal of these types of 
insanity appears to be based on his adherence to a conception of human agency that is rooted 
in Common Sense philosophical thought. According to Lord Hope, a man could not escape 
punishment if he had “allow[ed] a fancy or morbid feeling to get possession of his mind and 
temper” because, in breaking the law, he had given way to the temptations of “ill-regulated, 
morbid, distempered, and ungovernable feelings and passions” and had “indulge[d] in their 
gratification and satisfaction”s.60  
The same sentiments appear to have underpinned Lord Hope’s jury directions in 
George Lillie Smith,61 where he stated that “the law does not for one moment countenance 
the notion of moral insanity, which is largely written of and treated by numerous authors – 
that is to say, what they call irresistible impulses, by which man is driven into crime, while it 
is not proved that his reason is destroyed”.62 Again, the reasons given by Lord Hope were 
that the accused was not “insane and irresponsible morally on account of the length of time 
he has indulged angry and evil passions, or in respect of the power, strength and mastery 
                                                        
57 Lord Hope expressly rejected the idea that the law should follow medical views on insanity 
or afford medical opinion much weight (at 358). 
58 Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal 11. 
59 Ibid 39. 
60 Gibson at 360.  
61 (1855) 2 Irv 1.  
62 Ibid at 53.  
 15 
which they may have acquired over him”. He added that if, in such a state of mind, a man 
“chooses to commit crimes” and “gives way to temptations”, which are strong “only because 
he has long indulged in such thoughts”, the jury were to be assured that “he was not tempted 
above what he is able to bear” and was therefore rightly to be regarded as punishable.63 
This account of why volitional insanity would not excuse an offender both assumes a 
universal power of self-control and regards any misuse of this capacity as culpable. In 
support of this perspective, Lord Hope cited the Bible64 and Dr John Abercrombie,65 a pious 
Scottish physician turned metaphysicist, who is classed amongst the Common Sense 
philosophers66 and whose writings share many features with other, more prominent members 
of the school. Describing him as “the soundest on these subjects of all medical writers”, Lord 
Hope spoke approvingly of Abercrombie’s work, in which “the notion that a man…is insane 
and irresponsible merely on account of the extent to which he has indulged the angry and evil 
passions which have occupied his mind, or of the power and strength and mastery which they 
may have acquired over him from long brooding over the subjects of them, is nowhere 
countenanced”.67   
A persistent theme of Abercrombie’s writing, which comes out in Lord Hope’s jury 
directions, is that of moral degradation and its causes. In keeping with the works of Thomas 
Reid and Dugald Stewart, 68 Abercrombie held that every man possesses an innate ability 
(derived from what he variously termed the moral conscience or moral principle) to perceive 
                                                        
63 Ibid at 60. 
64 Gibson at 360 and Lillie Smith at 62. Lord Hope’s reliance on Biblical authority tallies with 
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moral truths, including the distinction between right and wrong, and to act in accordance with 
them.69 This capacity was intrinsically linked to the ability to control one’s passions; since 
the conscience was thought to have ‘supreme authority’ over the whole intellectual and moral 
system, it allowed for effective regulation of the passions, emotions and desires. 70  In 
accordance with this belief, Reid taught that there were simply no passions so strong as to be 
regarded irresistible. Although a passion that was difficult to control might alleviate blame, 
since it would not be irresistible it could not exculpate wholly.71   
The capacity to discern and follow the dictates of one’s conscience was mutable, 
however, and could diminish if disregarded or neglected.72 It was therefore the duty of every 
individual to make best use of his moral powers and develop them through habitual use, and 
failure in this endeavour was considered unquestionably culpable. Reid conceived of this 
process as a struggle against temptation, believing that overcoming undesirable passions was 
the primary way in which human virtue could flourish. 73  Indeed, the more difficult the 
conquest, the more glorious it was thought to be.74 Echoes of this confidence in man’s ability 
to grapple with and defeat his passions are present in Lord Hope’s instruction that to plead 
the insanity defence successfully “[t]he panel must be shewn [sic] to be unable, by the 
                                                        
69 J Abercrombie, The Philosophy of the Moral Feelings (1833) 15-17, 20-21, 141-142; T 
Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man (1788); D Stewart, The Philosophy of the Active 
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Enlightenment thought more generally. Building on the work of Lord Shaftesbury, Frances 
Hutcheson was the first to develop and fully defend the theory of ‘moral sense’ (W Frankena, 
“Hutcheson’s Moral Sense Theory” (1955) 16 (3) Journal of the History of Ideas 356 at 358). 
70  J Abercrombie, Inquiries Concerning the Intellectual Powers and the Investigation of 
Truth (1830) 429. 
71 Reid, Active Powers 319-320. Reid expressed these views in the context of the criminal 
law in a letter to the eighteenth century judge and philosopher Lord Kames, dating from 1772 
(P Wood (ed) The Correspondence of Thomas Reid (2002) 69-70). 
72  Abercrombie, Moral Feelings 11-12, 118-124. Reid and Stewart also recognised this 
possibility (Reid, Active Powers 269; Stewart, Active and Moral Powers 314). 
73 Reid, Active Powers 186-187. 
74 Ibid. 262; Stewart, Active and Moral Powers 314. 
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visitation of God, to do what his duty to God requires – to struggle and overcome his 
passions, which every man possessed of reason may”.75 
The consequences of failing to attend to, and habitually obey, one’s moral conscience 
could be dire, as portended by Abercrombie: “if the desires are allowed to break free from the 
restraints of reason and the moral principle, the man is left at the mercy of unhallowed 
passion, and is liable to those irregularities which naturally result from such a derangement of 
the moral feelings”.76 Importantly, Abercrombie did not regard this derangement as a form of 
insanity. He acknowledged the existence of what, “in the language of common life, we 
sometimes speak of as moral insanity”, in which one’s reason remains unimpaired but “every 
correct feeling appears obliterated” and the moral powers lose their sway.77 Yet he was clear 
that this condition was merely analogous to and not constitutive of insanity. In distinguishing 
between the provinces of reason and conscience, Abercrombie wrote that derangement of a 
man’s sense and approbation of moral relations is “in reference to the moral feeling, what 
insanity is in regard to the intellectual”.78 
Abercrombie’s denunciation of moral insanity as a form of mental disorder, is, I 
suggest, key to understanding Lord Hope’s endeavours to contain the new and unfamiliar 
forms insanity which threatened to undermine the law’s conception of criminal responsibility. 
These forms of insanity were not undesirable simply because they were inconsistently 
defined and thought to be unproven; nor was their rejection attributable solely to a 
professional ‘turf war’ between lawyers and medics. The idea of moral or volitional insanity 
was problematic to Lord Hope because it offended against the vision of human agency by 
which he abided. As I have sought to demonstrate, this conception of human agency was 
consistent with that of the Common Sense philosophers John Abercrombie, whom Lord Hope 
                                                        
75 George Lillie Smith at 62.  
76 Abercrombie, Moral Feelings 46. 
77 Abercrombie, Intellectual Powers 348-349.  
78 Abercrombie, Moral Feelings 147-148. 
 18 
expressly followed, and Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart, whose work Abercrombie closely 
replicated.   
 
D. PROVOCATION 
 
Traces of the Common Sense view of human agency, which appears to have underpinned 
Lord Hope’s rejection of volitional insanity, can also be discerned in the leading account of 
provocation given by Hume. As these traces imply, this perspective might therefore enable us 
to better understand the way the defence developed at the end of the eighteenth century and 
the limitations that were placed upon its availability. Prior to this time, there was some 
recognition that killing in the heat of the moment or in response to provocation was not as 
culpable as pre-meditated homicide. This recognition found form in the ancient distinction 
between intentional killing and killing chaude melle79 and the rule that revenge killings were 
unjustifiable.80 However, the explanation of provocation given by Hume shows that by the 
end of the eighteenth century the defence had developed more fully and specifically 
concerned the accused’s mental state.  
As Jeremy Horder has identified, this move towards greater recognition of mental 
state within the provocation defence is also evident within English law. During the eighteenth 
century, the defence, which had previously depended on the proportionality of the 
defendant’s reaction, came to depend on an assessment of whether he had lost self-control.81 
Horder attributes this change to the emergence of a qualitative distinction between reason and 
                                                        
79 Chaud melle or rixa was an ancient term that referred to homicide committed ‘on a sudden, 
and in heat of blood’ (W Bell, A Dictionary and Digest of the Law of Scotland, with Short 
Explanations of the Most Ordinary English Law Terms (1839) 160).  
80 George Mackenzie, Laws and Customes of Scotland in Matters Criminal: wherein it is to 
be shown how the civil law, and the laws and customs of other nations do agree with, and 
supply ours, 1678, repr. (2005) Title XI. 
81 J Horder, Provocation and Responsibility (1992) ch 5. 
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the passions, after which the test for provocation became whether the controlling power of 
reason had been eclipsed by the passions.82 Due to uncertainty over the mitigatory effect of 
provocation prior to the publication of Hume’s Commentaries,83 it is difficult to undertake a 
similar assessment of Scots law. However, it is apparent that the relationship between reason 
and the passions is fundamental to the way Hume conceived of the defence, and the nature of 
this relationship suggests an affinity with Reid’s view of human agency. These conceptual 
parallels are likely attributable to Hume’s having been a student at the University of Glasgow 
during the years Reid was professor of moral philosophy.84 Since it was common at this time 
for law students to attend lectures given by philosophers at their institutions, it is likely that 
Hume would have been familiar with Reid’s theories on the intellectual and active powers.85 
Hume differentiates between provoked and unprovoked homicide, describing the 
former as actuated by “the sudden impulse of resentment, excited by the provocation of high 
and real injuries, and accompanied with terror and agitation of the spirits”.86 The phrases 
“impulse of resentment” and “agitation of the spirits” suggest the defence was expected to 
accommodate the kind of immediate and passionate response that Horder attributes to the 
shift in English law. 87  The first of these terms, when expounded in full, also betrays 
numerous similarities with Reid’s conception of human agency. Hume writes: 
 
                                                        
82 Ibid 73. 
83 L Farmer, Criminal Law, Tradition and Legal Order: crime and the genius of Scots law 
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For although, along with other animals, we are subject to the impulse of resentment 
on injuries, which is necessary to our preservation; yet it is not in our species, as in 
theirs, a blind and ungovernable impulse, which transports us whithersoever it will; 
but has been placed by the Author of our nature, under the controul [sic] of a superior 
principle, which may serve to restrain it within those just bounds, where it answers its 
proper ends; and by means of which, if duly and habitually exerted, not only the 
conduct of the man on any particular occasion may be regulated, but even the feeling 
itself be in a great measure chastened and subdued…To gain this state of self-
command, is part of every man’s duty…88 
 
This description accords with Reid’s discussion of the “malevolent affection” resentment, of 
which, he writes, there are two types. Sudden resentment, which is a blind impulse raised by 
hurt of any kind, is a response common to humans and “brute-animals” whereas deliberate 
resentment, which is raised by injury, is a rational principle and can therefore only be 
experienced by man, who possesses rational faculties.89 Despite this difference, Reid explains 
that these two forms of resentment are often intermixed and induce similar effects: an 
“uneasy sensation, which disturbs the peace of mind” and the impetus to seek redress.90  
In his account of provocation, it appears Hume is referring to a composite of the two 
kinds of resentment outlined by Reid, specifying that although we share the impulse of 
resentment with other animals, we can restrain it through use of a “superior principle”. This 
reference to a superior principle is another similarity between Hume and Reid’s writings. As 
Reid makes clear, deliberate resentment requires an opinion of the injury done or intended, so 
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implies an appreciation of justice and therefore possession of a moral faculty.91 He adds that 
this moral faculty is part of man’s “leading principle”, reason, which presides over the 
passions, including the feeling of resentment when it is sufficiently inflamed. 92  Reid’s 
conception of the relationship between resentment, passions, and reason, which includes the 
moral faculty, closely resembles Hume’s description of provocation. It is for the “superior 
principle”, reason, to keep the feeling of resentment, a passion, within “just and salutary 
bounds”, an assessment that requires a sense of justice and, as such, a moral faculty. 
As shown in the previous section, the duty to make best use of one’s God-given 
powers was a feature of Reid’s philosophy and it was through exercise and habit that this 
duty could be fulfilled. 93  Similarly, according to Hume, proper and habitual use of the 
“superior principle” was the means by which resentment might be contained within its proper 
bounds and each man might gain self-command. In the context of the criminal law, failure to 
meet this duty of self-command was constituted by engaging in mortal retaliation without 
adequately serious cause. Only when the provocation endured was very grave, often to the 
endangerment of life, would the accused be excused for “the loss of his presence of mind, 
and excess of the just measure of retaliation”.94 By Hume’s account, this sort of behaviour 
ought to be punished to put men “on their guard” and to “serve as a corrective of sudden 
passion”.95 Though the defence was thought necessary to allow for the limited “degree of 
perfection to which our constitution permits us to aspire”, it was deemed essential to keep it 
“within as narrow bounds as we safely can” because “by means of such discipline we may 
improve and be corrected”.96  
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As with English law, the accused would have no excuse if he appeared to be “master 
of his emotions”, yet under Scots law the boundaries of the defence were more narrowly 
drawn. 97  Whereas “any assault” could extenuate culpability in England, in Scotland 
punishment would be mitigated only if the person had been “assaulted and injured”. 98 
According to Hume, the defence was limited in recognition of man’s universal capacity to 
control his passions and for the purpose of strengthening this divine gift. The law therefore 
echoed the philosophical premises that every person had a duty to master his passions and 
emotions, and that this duty was one that all were capable of fulfilling. Furthermore, it 
valorised the struggle to fulfil this duty by encouraging offenders and innocent observers to 
strengthen their powers of self-control by engaging in their proper use and habitual practise. 
In both of these respects, the law expressed doctrines that were central to the Scottish 
Common Sense school of thought, and in particular to the philosophy of Reid, with which 
Hume would very likely have been familiar.  
 
E. COMMON SENSE AND SOUNDNESS OF MIND 
 
The previous sections sought to demonstrate that Lord Hope’s rejection of volitional insanity 
and Hume’s development of the provocation defence both reflect the conception of human 
agency set out by key Common Sense philosophers. This is the first strand of the broader 
claim of this article: that the Common Sense school of thought played an important role in 
shaping mental state defences in nineteenth century Scotland. The second strand is based 
upon a tendency, beginning in the second half of the century, to allow the jury considerable 
discretion in negating or reducing criminal responsibility on the basis of mental state. Within 
the insanity defence, this tendency is evident in the “soundness of mind” test, laid down by 
                                                        
97 Ibid 389. 
98 Ibid 379. 
 23 
Lord Moncreiff in the 1870s, which encouraged the jury to use their common sense and 
knowledge of everyday life to assess the accused’s sanity. Outside the insanity defence, this 
tendency is apparent in the way diminished responsibility developed, under the direction of 
Lord Deas, from a plea based purely on punishment, to be considered by the executive, to a 
plea that affected criminal responsibility, to be considered by the jury.  
 By affording the jury extensive discretion in judging the accused’s sanity and 
culpability, Lords Moncreiff and Deas showed significant regard for lay opinion. Of course, 
the belief that insanity was a matter of common sense existed in Scots law prior to Lord 
Moncreiff’s reworking of the insanity defence and was commonly held outside Scotland 
too.99 What is remarkable about the developments in Scotland towards the end of the century, 
however, is the degree of trust that was placed in lay opinion and the fact that these changes 
occurred at a time when, in keeping with the rise of scientific naturalism, mental disorder was 
increasingly being understood in scientific and physiological terms. 100  This development 
seems to signify an important stage in the process by which expert medical knowledge of 
insanity, which had been accumulating since the early nineteenth century, broke away from 
the body of common knowledge out of which it grew.101 In accordance with this shift, the 
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experts concerned asserted their ability to identify insanity through examination of the 
patient’s history and circumstances102 and continued to provide evidence in criminal trials.103  
As Arlie Loughnan has argued more generally, the rise of expert knowledge never 
fully displaced lay knowledge in the criminal justice practices of responsibility attribution. 
Jurors and legal actors, including lawyers and judges, continued to rely on lay knowledge in 
the course of their pleadings and determinations. Even expert knowledge remained, according 
to Loughnan, qualitatively indistinct from lay knowledge. The expertise claimed by medical 
men was based on their vast exposure to insanity, rather than some alternative body of 
knowledge that was inaccessible to ordinary people.104 Yet the significance accorded to lay 
knowledge by Lords Moncreiff and Deas towards the end of the nineteenth century remains 
extraordinary, even when set against these observations. Jurors in Scotland were not only 
charged with undertaking an evaluation of the accused’s sanity; they were instructed to make 
this assessment on the basis of lay knowledge of the kind acquired by lay persons in the 
course of their everyday lives.   
This high esteem for lay knowledge coheres with the prominence of ‘common sense’ 
within Scottish Common Sense philosophy, particularly the works of Reid. Some critics of 
the Common Sense school misinterpreted, or misrepresented, this aspect of their philosophy 
as lending support to the vulgar whenever they ran up against the learned. 105  Giving 
preference to lay opinion, particularly in the face of mounting support for scientific 
explanations of insanity, can certainly be interpreted as an embodiment of this 
misconception. However, as with many of their contemporaries, Lords Deas and Moncreiff 
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would likely have been acquainted with Common Sense philosophy through their 
education 106  and interactions within the Faculty of Advocates. 107  Their Lordships are 
particularly likely to have been familiar with Common Sense philosophical works, for both 
excelled in the study of moral philosophy. Both won prizes in classes led by Professor John 
Wilson, from whom Lord Deas earned the further praise that his writing was ‘the perfection 
of clear, vulgar common sense’.108 In addition to excelling in classes in which Reid and 
Stewart’s work was very probably discussed,109 Lords Deas and Moncreiff both borrowed 
works of Common Sense philosophy from the Advocates Library.110 
If, as these factors indicate, their Lordships were versed in the oeuvre of Common 
Sense philosophers, an explanation of their confidence in lay evaluation based on a more 
nuanced understanding of these works seems plausible. Reid used the phrase ‘common sense’ 
to signify a basic level of rationality or, as he put it, the “inward light or sense” that enables 
us to manage our own affairs and makes us answerable for our conduct towards others.111  
Significantly, he characterised this rationality as “easily discerned by its effects in mens [sic] 
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actions, in their speeches, and even in their looks”. He added that “when it is made a 
question, whether a man has this natural gift or not, a judge or a jury, upon a short 
conversation with him, can, for the most part, determine the question with great 
assurance”.112 In other words, Reid conceived of common sense as the measure of sanity and 
held that it could easily be recognised by ordinary people. 
This second point ties in to a more general epistemological feature of Reid’s 
conception of ‘common sense’. He considered the ordinary person capable of assessing all 
matters within the realm of common understanding, stating that “[i]n a matter of common 
sense, every man is no less a competent judge than a Mathematician is in a mathematical 
demonstration”.113 This competence did not extend to “matters beyond the reach of common 
understanding”, however, in which “the many are led by the few, and willingly yield to their 
authority”.114 The effect of this use of the phrase ‘common sense’ is to designate an area of 
knowledge in which lay and expert opinion are of equal value. Reid’s first use of ‘common 
sense’, to mean rationality, brought the issue of sanity into the realm of common 
understanding and thus demarcated it a topic on which the ordinary man was equipped to 
exercise his judgment. In the same way, Lords Deas and Moncreiff classified rationality as a 
matter falling within the realm of common understanding and therefore properly amenable to 
lay assessment.  
 
(1) Lord Moncreiff and the insanity defence  
 
At the time Lord Moncreiff reworked the insanity defence, the test of non-responsibility, as 
set out in the judicial directions succeeding Lord Hope’s, was relatively stable. At least, these 
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directions were consistent to the extent that they adhered to a cognitive conception of insanity 
and were wary of the existence and implications of volitional insanity. For example, Lord 
Justice General Colonsay rejected the idea that alleged irresistible impulses might excuse the 
accused, stating:  
 
I can by no means endorse the doctrine that seems to be held, that when a man cannot 
control his disposition to do an act he is not responsible for it. Nothing is more 
common than a person being unable to control his passions…merely because you call 
it a paroxysm of monomania, that is not a reason for holding that such persons are to 
be held out of the pale of the law in regard to answering for the consequences of the 
crime they commit.115 
 
Though these remarks acknowledge that passions may be difficult to control, they are plainly 
not intended to imply that they are uncontrollable. It is the person who is unable to exercise 
control rather than the passions that are uncontrollable, which explains why the accused 
remains accountable. 
 Similarly, Lord Inglis held that such purported forms of insanity could not 
successfully be relied upon in the courtroom. In Alexander Milne,116 when counsel asked a 
medical witness if a patient with monomania might be aware of the nature of his crime and 
yet feel irresistibly impelled to commit it, Lord Inglis replied: “[i]f all the physicians in 
Europe were to state that, I would tell the jury that they must not believe it, or act on it”.117 
He followed this approach in Andrew Brown, 118  stating that nothing but mental disease 
overpowering one’s reason constituted insanity in the eyes of the law and added that a person 
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who was weak or had a violent or passionate temper after indulging bad habits, or who was 
deeply depraved due to faults in his education or person, could not rely on the defence.119 
 Even Lords Cockburn and Cowan, who relaxed the insanity defence enough to 
recognise a volitional element, did so cautiously and without abandoning the need for 
cognitive impairment. In James Denny Scott120 Lord Cockburn explained that the defence 
required absolute insanity at the moment and in relation to the criminal act, adding that it 
might apply when the accused was under “an impulse, so irresistible to him, that he was not a 
free agent”.121 This endorsement of volitional insanity was quickly qualified with the proviso 
that it should be recognised with “great jealousy”, for it was difficult to distinguish true 
incapacity of resistance from false.122 Similarly, though Lord Cowan extended the defence to 
cases where the accused was deprived, through mental disease, of the ability to “controul 
[sic] his actions and desires”, this lack of control was conceived in terms of insufficient 
rational power.123  
  In the main, therefore, prior to Lord Moncreiff’s reformulation of the insanity defence 
juries were informed that the test of insanity was essentially cognitive, with the tentative 
addition of a restricted form of volitional insanity. These directions reflected concerns that 
“wilful and atrocious actions of wickedness should be metamorphosed into spasms of 
disease” and the foundations of morality and responsibility thereby undermined. 124  This 
concern, which was partly founded on the difficulty of distinguishing disease from depravity, 
was exacerbated by the perceived inability of medical men to assist in this task.125 However, 
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as noted above, by the last third of the century the rise of mental science and the 
consolidation of expert medical evidence meant that these fears, though still prevalent, had 
lost some of their potency.126  
 Lord Moncreiff’s directions to the jury should be understood in the context of this 
shift, for one of his reasons for departing from his predecessors’ directions was that the test 
they had sometimes cited – “knowledge of right and wrong” (which he labelled an 
‘unscientific maxim’) – had resulted in ‘much unreasoning inhumanity’.127 As his Lordship 
pointed out, a man could form and understand the idea of right and wrong and yet be 
hopelessly insane.128 By purposefully distancing himself from older tests of insanity and 
stating that a lack of control arising from a “morbid state of mind” was clearly 
distinguishable from one arising from “evil inclinations”, “passions” or “feeble self-
control”,129 Lord Moncreiff seemed to align himself with more modern, scientific views of 
mental disorder. 
Certainly, his rejection of earlier tests of insanity was lauded by Dr David Yellowlees, 
physician superintendent at Glasgow Royal Asylum, who saw this as a “wonderful 
advance”,130 and his widening of the defence to accommodate cases which would likely have 
been excluded earlier in the century131 was progressive. Even his decision to avoid defining 
insanity altogether132 corresponded with some medical views of mental disorder, according to 
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which insanity was of no definite entity 133  and comprised many diseases. 134  Yet Lord 
Moncreiff consistently maintained that insanity was “fortunately…not a matter in which 
either the opinion of doctors or the definitions of lawyers can be held conclusive”.135 The 
only directions he gave were that the jury were to determine whether the accused was of 
“sound mind” 136  using “the ordinary rules which apply in daily life” 137  and “common 
practical sense”.138   
Given the shift towards understanding mental disorder scientifically and Lord 
Moncreiff’s relatively advanced views, this marginalization of medical opinion appears 
somewhat problematic. Lord Moncreiff was less hostile towards medical witnesses than some 
of his predecessors,139 but he nevertheless undermined their evidence, informing the jury that 
it “may be useful but on the main grounds on which it [the question of soundness of mind] 
must be solved you are as good judges of the sanity of any man as exhibited in daily life, as 
any lawyer or doctor can be. Indeed much better”. 140  In Lord Moncreiff’s view, if an 
individual could conduct himself with propriety in the course of ordinary life and was not 
excluded from the confidence of his fellows there was no reason to doubt his sanity. Indeed, 
his Lordship thought this assessment advanced the jury nine-tenths of the way towards 
determining the accused’s sanity, with only “exceptional instances” of intermittent insanity or 
insanity confined to specific subjects posing any diagnostic challenge. 141 
                                                        
133 J C Bucknill, “The Diagnosis of Insanity” (1856) 2 (6) Asylum Journal 229 at 229-230. 
134 “The Plea of Insanity in Criminal Cases” at 382. 
135 Sinclair at 90; Miller at 17; Macklin at 260. 
136 Sinclair at 90; Miller at 17; Macklin at 259. 
137 Macklin at 260. The same test was prescribed in Barr at 263. 
138 Miller at 17. 
139  This coheres with developments in England, where by the 1880s and 1890s judicial 
pronouncements exhibited less anxiety over medical opinion (T Ward, “Law, Common Sense 
and the Authority of Science: Expert Witnesses and Criminal Insanity in England, Ca. 1840-
1940” (1997) 6 Social and Legal Studies 343 at 346). 
140 Macklin at 260. See also Sinclair at 92. 
141 Macklin at 261. 
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This purely quotidian test of insanity was condemned by Dr Yellowlees, who wrote 
that while it could perhaps be used to infer insanity, the converse was not true. 142  My 
suggestion is that this test reflects the meaning of ‘common sense’ advanced by Reid, with 
whose work Lord Moncreiff was likely to have been familiar. In much the same way as Reid, 
Lord Moncreiff considered sanity a matter falling within the realm of common understanding 
and thus a matter in which lay assessment was reliable. Similarly, like Reid, he considered 
the measure of sanity to be one’s ability to manage the everyday tasks of life and maintain the 
confidence of one’s peers. Lord Moncreiff’s faith in the common sense of the jury is, I would 
argue, only fully comprehensible in light of these associations, for without them his rebuff of 
both medical and legal understandings of mental disorder seems to jar with his apparent 
regard for medical knowledge and his commitment to progressing the law.   
 
(2) The development of diminished responsibility  
 
Apart from Lord Moncreiff’s directions on the insanity defence, the tendency in Scots law to 
allow jurors wide discretion in assessing sanity and criminal responsibility is evident in the 
development of the doctrine of diminished responsibility. At the start of the nineteenth 
century, the flexible and informal nature of sentencing practices meant that Scottish courts 
could take mental weakness into account when determining the sentence of the accused or 
whether to recommend mercy.143 Indeed this practice can be traced back further,144 but it was 
during the nineteenth century that the plea developed into a doctrine which could alter the 
category of crime of which the accused was convicted.  
                                                        
142 Yellowlees (n 130) at 230. 
143 G H Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland, M G A Christie (ed) (2000-2001) para 11.03. 
144  Mackenzie and Hume both recognised that partial responsibility could moderate 
punishment (Mackenzie, Matters Criminal 16; Hume, Commentaries 36).  
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The case which heralded this change was HM Advocate v Dingwall145 in which the 
accused, who was reliant on alcohol, suffered from delirium tremens and had apparently been 
rendered weak-minded by severe sunstroke, pled insanity. Even though Dingwall’s condition 
did not constitute legal insanity, Lord Deas charged the jury that he “could not say that it was 
beyond the province of the jury to find a verdict of culpable homicide if they thought that was 
the nature of the offence” and that the accused’s weakness of mind was an element they 
could take into account in making this decision.146 This decision was re-enforced in HM 
Advocate v McLean, 147  when Lord Deas stated that it was right and legally sound for 
weakness of intellect or mental infirmity to modify both the crime of which the accused was 
convicted and the punishment he would receive.148 In the following years, and up until the 
twentieth century, Lord Deas’ views gained ready acceptance.149 
 According to Gerald Gordon, this expansion was not a conscious decision to 
strengthen the connection between mental state and responsibility but a consequence of the 
mandatory penalty for murder. Since the only way to reduce a mandatory capital sentence 
was to amend the nature of the conviction,150 the plea evolved to enable this practice and was 
rationalised to create the impression that it affected responsibility as well as punishment.151 
Irrespective of whether the development was simply a pragmatic way of circumventing the 
death penalty, its consequence was that a fuller range of mental impairments was recognised 
as having a bearing on criminal responsibility. 
 As with Lord Moncreiff’s reworking of the insanity defence, this change should be 
read in light of the requirements of the insanity defence at the time. Although Lords 
                                                        
145 (1867) 5 Irv 466. 
146 Ibid at 479. 
147 (1876) 3 Coup 334. 
148 Ibid at 337-338.  
149 Gordon, Criminal Law para 11.14. 
150 Other than by commuted sentence. 
151 Gordon, Criminal Law para 11.03.  
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Cockburn and Cowan had made inroads into accepting volitional insanity, at the time 
Dingwall was decided the test for insanity was essentially cognitive and absolute. In 
explaining the plea to the jury, Lord Deas explained that Dingwall’s case did not involve total 
deprivation of reason or delusions and that, in light of this, the best guidance he could offer 
was that if they found Dingwall to have committed the killing with “sufficient mental 
capacity to know, and did know, that the act was contrary to the law, and punishable by the 
law, it would be their duty to convict him”.152 The decision to allow mental weakness to 
affect criminal responsibility thus marked a novel legal acknowledgement of the many shades 
and varieties of mental disorder that medics had long-recognised. With the emergence of 
culpable homicide as a positive category of offence153 and the already permeable boundary 
between factors relating to defences (and therefore conviction) and mitigating factors relating 
to sentencing,154 the expansion of diminished responsibility was remarkably simple.155  
It is significant that Lord Deas located the power to assess whether mental state 
should be taken into account in “the province of the jury”. The decision was not to be made 
by medical professionals, nor circumscribed by the judiciary or executive. In this sense, the 
development of diminished responsibility corresponds with the changes in the insanity 
defence which began, under Lord Moncreiff, to open up and was placed more completely in 
the hands of the jury. These developments, which reduced the discrepancy between medical 
understandings of mental disorder and legal notions of non-responsibility, while continuing 
to sideline medical opinion in favour of lay evaluation, can be understood as reflections of 
                                                        
152 Dingwall at 476. 
153 Farmer, Tradition and Legal Order 147. 
154 Loughnan, Manifest Madness 227. 
155 The transition was unnoticed by some. An article from 1890 states that it was unfortunate 
that Scots law did not recognise degrees of criminal responsibility or responsibility with a 
diminished amount of imputability (E F Willoughby, “The Criminal Responsibility of the 
Insane” (1890) 2 Juridical Review 220 at 233).  
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the Scottish philosophical culture of the nineteenth century in which ‘common sense’ was 
prized. 
 
F. CONCLUSION 
 
When the pleas of insanity, diminished responsibility and provocation are viewed together, 
the significance of Common Sense philosophy in the development of mental state defences in 
nineteenth century Scotland emerges most clearly. Though these defences seem disparate, 
with little but their association with the accused’s mental state to connect them, each appears 
to bear the imprint of Common Sense philosophical thought. A close examination of the way 
Lord Hope prevented any extension of the insanity defence in the middle of the century 
reveals that the model of human agency on which his efforts were based closely resembles 
that expounded by the Common Sense philosophers John Abercrombie, whom his Lordship 
cited, and Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart, by whom Abercrombie was influenced. A 
similar perspective is manifest in the principles underpinning the provocation defence, as set 
out by Hume. 
In addition to this model of human agency, central features of the Common Sense 
perspective on rationality and epistemology are expressed in Lord Moncreiff’s development 
of the insanity defence in the last third of the century, and in the changing nature of the plea 
of diminished responsibility. Taking account of the importance of philosophical learning 
within the legal profession (and indeed civil society more generally) at the time these changes 
occurred, and the extent to which Lords Hope, Moncreiff and Deas were exposed to works of 
Common Sense philosophy, these conceptual parallels take on additional significance. 
Viewed against this backdrop, the similarities between Common Sense philosophy and the 
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Scottish law on mental state defences suggest that the former had a formative role in the 
development of the latter. 
In terms of our historical understanding of this area of Scots law, the implications of 
this insight extend beyond the nineteenth century. The directions laid down by Lord 
Moncreiff were administered to juries until relatively recently, such as in HM Advocate v 
Kidd where the jury were told that they should ask themselves whether the accused was of 
unsound mind not by ‘inquiring into all the technical terms and ideas that the medical 
witnesses have put before you’ but through ‘exercise of your commonsense and knowledge 
of mankind…judged on the ordinary rules on which men act in daily life’. 156 Likewise, 
scepticism as to the value of medical knowledge, as pitched against common sense, continued 
into the twentieth century. In 1946, after a presentation by the former Commissioner of 
Prisons at the Annual Meeting of the Royal Medico-Psychological Association in Edinburgh 
Lord Cooper, the then Lord Justice Clerk, stated:   
 
[t]he person you have to convince is the man in the jury box, who is apt to apply to 
such matters the yardstick of a robust and vigorous common sense, and who feels in 
his bones that you cannot convert a criminal into a patient by the simple expedient of 
describing the age-long characteristics of the typical criminal in words borrowed from 
ancient Greek philosophy.157  
 
                                                        
156  1960 JC 61 at 70. The defence relieving mentally disordered people of criminal 
responsibility is now statutory (s51A Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995). 
157 W Norwood East, “The Legal Aspects of Psychiatry: Crime and Punishment” (1946) 92 
(389) Journal of Mental Science 682 at 702. A similar attitude can be seen within the law of 
diminished responsibility e.g. Carraher v HM Advocate 1956 JC 108 where Lord Justice 
General Normand stated that: ‘The Court has a duty to see that trial by judge and jury 
according to law is not subordinated to medical theories; and in this instance much of the 
evidence given by the medical witnesses is, to my mind, descriptive rather of a typical 
criminal than of a person of the quality of one whom the law has hitherto regarded as being 
possessed of diminished responsibility’ (at 117). 
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In order to appreciate these attitudes, and the context in which they were forged, it is 
necessary to recognise them as more than the product of a medico-legal struggle for 
dominance – they embody a commitment to lay evaluation which, in the case of Scotland, has 
a special place in the country’s intellectual history.  
These implications extend beyond Scots law, for the notion that ‘madness’ relies on 
lay knowledge and is ‘readable’ by non-experts continues to resonate more widely. 158 
Locating such confidence in lay evaluation within a particular philosophical context reminds 
us of the importance of understanding law and legal history from a culturally informed 
standpoint. The currency of Common Sense philosophy in nineteenth century Scotland makes 
it especially germane in understanding the position of lay knowledge within Scots criminal 
law. Yet this association invites further consideration of the links between our understanding 
of criminal responsibility, and indeed other aspects of law, and the history of ideas more 
generally.  
 Finally, the connection between Scottish Common Sense philosophy and the 
development of mental state defences in Scotland provides an additional layer to our 
understanding of this philosophical movement and its import. There are numerous works on 
the scholarship of Reid,159 some of which160 are important contributions to the larger body of 
scholarship that is concerned with the links between law and the Scottish Enlightenment.161 
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Nevertheless, there remains scope for further inquiry in this field, to which this article is a 
contribution.  
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